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Introduction 
 
 
Power Shift in Tunisia 
Electoral Success of Secular Parties Might Deepen Polarization 
Anne Wolf 
Tunisia’s main secular party, Nidaa Tounes, emerged as the largest force in the October 
2014 parliamentary elections. The party’s leader has also a high chance of being elected 
president in a runoff ballot in late December. The results risk to increase polarization 
between Islamists and secularists, especially if Nidaa Tounes forms an all-secular gov-
ernment coalition. It might also deepen frictions between the country’s marginalized 
regions and the richer Tunis and coastal belt. Already, the success of Tunisia’s main 
secular party has triggered protests in the poor south, as some people accuse Nidaa 
Tounes of rejecting more conservative sections of society and criticize its close asso-
ciations with some former members of Ben Ali’s regime and the business sector. These 
ties and vested interests are likely to make it more difficult to launch structural eco-
nomic reforms. They also risk to foster alienation, especially among young Tunisians, 
and might trigger radicalization. Europe should continue to support Tunisia’s young 
democracy with financial aid as well as specific economic and security expertise, and, 
most importantly, promote cooperation between various ideological forces. 
 
Tunisia held its first post-revolution general 
parliamentary and presidential elections 
on October 26 and November 23, 2014. The 
ballots were classified by international ob-
servers as being by and large free and fair, 
thereby reaffirming the democratic process 
almost four years after the ouster of Zine 
el-Abidine Ben Ali. The outcome of the 
elections implies a major shift in political 
power, which had been marked by a strong 
Ennahda party and fragmented secularists 
since the October 2011 elections, when the 
Islamists had gained 37 percent of the vote, 
followed by the secular Congress for the 
Republic (CPR) with 8.7 percent and Etta-
katol with 7 percent. 
The main secular party, Nidaa Tounes 
(Call for Tunisia), emerged as the largest 
force in this year’s parliamentary elections, 
winning 86 of the 217 seats in the legis-
lature, followed by Ennahda with 69 seats. 
The parties next in line are the Free Patri-
otic Union (UPL), which lacks any distinct 
political orientation, with 16; the leftist 
Popular Front coalition with 15; and the 
liberal Afek Tounes with 8 seats. It is strik-
ing that all of the secular parties that did 
well in the 2014 parliamentary elections 
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did rather poorly in the 2011 Constituent 
Assembly elections or did not exist at the 
time, like Nidaa Tounes. Many Tunisians 
are longing for a new start. They were dis-
appointed with the former Troika govern-
ment – a coalition of Ennahda with the 
CPR and Ettakatol. The CPR gained only 
four seats while Ettakatol was left without 
any parliamentary representation at all, 
as many secular Tunisians reproached both 
parties for having been co-opted by the 
Islamists. 
The first round of the presidential ballot 
in November 2014 reaffirmed the success 
of Nidaa Tounes. Nidaa Tounes’ Beji Caid 
Essebsi came first (39.5 percent), followed 
by the current interim president, CPR’s 
Moncef Marzouki (33.4 percent). A runoff 
between both candidates will be held in 
late December. Essebsi has a high chance 
of winning, especially because he has the 
support of the business elite and major 
media outlets. 
Nidaa Tounes, which was formed in 
mid-2012 by Essebsi – former interim prime 
minister who was also interior minister 
under Habib Bourguiba and president of 
parliament under Ben Ali – has promised 
to unite secular parties around a “modern 
democratic project” to counter Ennahda. 
During the first year of the Troika govern-
ment, internal fragmentation had weakened 
secular parties in government and oppo-
sition and reinforced the dominance of 
Ennahda. Therefore, many secular Tuni-
sians were keen to join Nidaa Tounes, 
including former members of the Ben Ali 
regime, important businessmen, as well as 
leftists, trade unionists, independents, and 
members of the Destourian (constitution) 
Movement. The Destourian Movement 
had a central role in the fight for Tunisian 
independence. Under Bourguiba it took 
the form of the Neo-Destour and later the 
Socialist Destour Party, while Ben Ali sub-
sequently established the Constitutional 
Democratic Rally (RCD), which became 
primarily an apparatus of patronage and 
cronyism that had very little to do with 
the original movement. 
In the elections, Nidaa Tounes was able 
to capitalize on the economic downturn 
and the emergence of political violence 
in 2012, which reinforced the perception 
of many secularists that a major political 
change was needed to keep the transition 
on track. Ennahda’s perceived dominance 
following the 2011 elections had led to 
increasing polarization between Islamists 
and secularists over the past two years. This 
came to a head after the assassination of 
two secular politicians in February and July 
2013 by radical Islamists, which fuelled 
popular protests that summer. The simul-
taneous coup against the Muslim Brother-
hood’s Muhammed Mursi, former president 
of Egypt, made many secularists believe 
that Ennahda could also be forced out of 
office, but mainly through protests. It thus 
ultimately strengthened Nidaa Tounes. In 
fact, the Islamist-led government was forced 
to resign in January 2014 and a techno-
cratic government took over. 
Ennahda did not present or support 
any presidential candidate in the November 
elections, because it initially assumed 
that it had a high chance of becoming the 
strongest force in parliament and did not 
want to be perceived as dominating politics 
once again. In Tunisia’s system of govern-
ment, the president has power in the realm 
of foreign affairs and defense, whereas most 
other executive tasks remain with the prime 
minister. The absence of an Islamist can-
didate in the presidential elections also 
explains the relative success of Marzouki, 
for whom many conservative Tunisians 
voted, especially in the south and interior 
regions. 
However, Ennahda’s success in gaining 
69 parliamentary seats in the October 2014 
elections – despite broad levels of frustra-
tion among the public with the former Troi-
ka government – still reaffirms the Islam-
ists as a major force in politics. Ennahda’s 
relative success is partially due to the 
absence of other important conservative 
parties as well as to the fact that the Islam-
ists tend to be better organized than any 
other party, have a strong party platform, 
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and are represented in all regions. Most im-
portantly, however, the Islamist base had 
created strong bonds during the decades of 
repression it suffered under Ben Ali, which 
has led to a level of unity that secular par-
ties lack. Following the Troika government, 
moreover, Ennahda was quite successful in 
convincing its constituency that the Islam-
ists were not able to perform better in gov-
ernment because the opposition did not 
assume a constructive democratic function 
but rather boycotted many policies. 
Changing Priorities 
Tunisia’s new political landscape reflects 
how the priorities of many Tunisians have 
changed. Whereas in 2011 parties with 
a track record on human rights, strong 
identity politics, and a history of anti-Ben 
Ali militancy did well, in 2014 people 
elected parties they perceived as being 
able to solve their economic malaise and 
security concerns. In early recognition of 
that, even Ennahda, which had in the past 
harshly condemned Tunisia’s economic 
elite, integrated important businessmen on 
their electoral lists – including the head of 
Syphax Airlines – to create the impression 
that it would provide better governance 
than under the Troika government. 
An increasing number of Tunisians pre-
fer stability and a strong leadership figure 
over democracy. An October 2014 Pew sur-
vey found that only 48 percent of Tunisians 
think that democracy is preferable to other 
kinds of government, compared to 63 per-
cent of Tunisians polled just months after 
the 2011 revolution. Moreover, 59 percent 
of the population today prefer a strong 
leader over a democratic government, as 
opposed to 37 percent in 2012. General 
disillusionment with parties and their rep-
resentatives is also very high: 65 percent of 
those polled think that “political leaders 
are only interested in power and personal 
gain.” Given that many Tunisians have been 
dissatisfied with the democratic process, 
only 3.18 million of the 8.4 million eligible 
voters cast a vote in the first round of presi-
dential elections – about one million less 
than in the 2011 ballot. 
Moreover, more than twice as many 
Tunisians prefer Nidaa Tounes when 
presented with a list of parties, compared 
to when they are being asked in an open 
question about their political preferences. 
This signals that many Tunisians voted for 
Nidaa Tounes for lack of a better alternative 
rather than because they strongly believe in 
the party. Many Tunisians, including secular 
voices, have been especially critical of the 
age of Essebsi (88) as well as the integration 
of many former representatives of Ben Ali’s 
regime. Many also resent the quick rise 
of Essebsi’s son, Hafedh, who was initially 
installed at the head of Nidaa Tounes’ list 
for the electoral district Tunis 1, but later 
had to resign owing to internal protests, 
given that he did not have any obvious cre-
dentials for this position. 
Nidaa Tounes’ Options 
Nidaa Tounes is the only party capable of 
forming a government. Too many parties 
in parliament are categorically opposed to 
Ennahda, which makes it impossible for the 
Islamists to assemble a coalition. No party 
other than Nidaa Tounes has this kind of 
leverage. However, Nidaa Tounes will need 
23 more deputies to achieve an absolute 
majority in parliament. This presents Nidaa 
Tounes with two main political options: 
forming an all-secular coalition, or a broad 
coalition that includes the Islamists. 
An all-Secular Coalition 
Nidaa Tounes has already contacted several 
secular parties and candidates to assess the 
feasibility of establishing a coalition with 
them. However, its relations with the second 
biggest secular party in parliament, the UPL, 
have remained strained, given the rivalry 
between the parties’ leaders. The UPL is 
centered around the leadership figure of 
wealthy Slim Riahi, whose comparatively 
young age (42 years) and economic success 
through activities in oil production and 
SWP Comments 54 
December 2014 
3 
property development in Libya led some 
Tunisians to believe that he could put Tuni-
sia’s economy on the right track. Riahi also 
has strong financial links to the media and 
owns a football club, which certainly helped 
him while campaigning. He describes the 
UPL as a “modernist, non-ideological” party 
of the center. The idea of “non-ideological” 
parties has gained prominence in Tunisia 
as a strategy to denounce opponents such 
as the Islamists – and to a lesser degree the 
far left – as “ideologues,” i.e., dangerous 
radicals with impractical ideas. It is essen-
tially used by secular parties – including 
not only the UPL but also Nidaa Tounes – 
to appear pragmatic and rational. 
The UPL has promised to rebuild Tuni-
sia’s interior regions, generate 422,000 jobs, 
and eradicate terrorism within six months. 
Yet it will be unlikely to live up to these 
promises, not least because of the lack of 
resources to induce large-scale develop-
ment and job-creation and the absence of a 
detailed party program. Riahi, just as Nidaa 
Tounes’ Essebsi, also ran in presidential 
elections, which increased the political 
rivalry between both candidates. Since the 
parliamentary elections, leaders of the UPL 
have met several times with Ennahda, in-
dicating that Riahi is much more flexible 
with regard to collaboration with the Islam-
ists than the Popular Front. However, on 
December 5, Riahi officially endorsed the 
presidential candidacy of Essebsi for the 
runoff ballot after an agreement between 
both parties. 
The Popular Front has expressed its 
openness toward being part of a secular 
coalition. The alliance of leftists and Arab 
nationalist parties rose in prominence fol-
lowing the two political assassinations in 
2013 – in both cases of Popular Front poli-
ticians – and in subsequent prominence 
while staging anti-regime protests as part 
of the National Salvation Front, a coalition 
of secular parties and associations that 
eventually forced the Troika government 
to resign. 
It is open to a secular coalition despite 
the fact that many of its members and key 
leadership figures deeply resent Nidaa 
Tounes’ integration of former members of 
Ben Ali’s regime. Indeed, many leftists had 
been harshly persecuted by Ben Ali and sub-
jected to torture. The Popular Front itself 
was created in October 2012 to overcome 
the increasingly bipolar political landscape 
between Nidaa Tounes and Ennahda, which 
they perceived as a threat to democratic 
transition. Working with Nidaa Tounes will 
therefore be difficult for the Popular Front, 
but is probably still preferable to being left 
out of an all-secular coalition. Already in the 
past, the Popular Front has opted to work 
with Nidaa Tounes, which it still prefers to 
Ennahda, in order to “contain Islamism.” 
Significantly, the Popular Front and Nidaa 
Tounes together led the National Salvation 
Front – although the alliance broke apart 
quickly after the Troika government re-
signed. Being part of the government and 
formulating concrete policies might also 
prove difficult for the Popular Front, which 
has relied more than most parties on criti-
cizing rather than trying to find solutions 
to Tunisia’s post-revolution challenges. 
On the other side, Nidaa Tounes’ former 
RCD members, who have become very influ-
ential within the party, have reservations 
over an alliance with the Popular Front, 
because the latter voted on May 1, 2014, 
in favor of a political exclusion law, which 
would have prevented former members 
of Ben Ali’s regime from running for office. 
This wing also propagates a liberal eco-
nomic program, which is opposed by Nidaa 
Tounes’ leftists as well as Popular Front 
members. 
By contrast, Afek Tounes is open to join-
ing both a secular government as well as a 
broad-based government. Its success in the 
election is owed to a combination of strong 
business links, its niche ideology in Tunisia, 
as well as a clearly defined political program. 
Indeed, most secular parties have positioned 
themselves on the center or the center-left 
and failed to deliver a clear party platform. 
Afek Tounes proposes solutions to terror-
ism and crime; policies to increase the 
quality of health services and education; 
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reforms to Tunisia’s top-heavy administra-
tion; as well as liberal economic policies. 
An alliance with Afek Tounes could be the 
basis for a broad coalition dominated by 
Nidaa Tounes, whose liberal wing is strong-
ly represented in parliament, as well as the 
Islamists, who also tend to advocate eco-
nomic liberalism. 
A Broad Coalition 
A broad coalition would include all major 
political forces. The option was already 
presented in the form of a national unity 
government prior to the 2011 elections 
by Ennahda, the CPR, and Ettakatol, but 
it failed to resonate widely among other 
secular parties. The latter did not believe 
that secularists and Islamists could work 
together and maintained that Ennahda 
would anyway try to dominate politics. As 
a result, a smaller coalition between secu-
larists and Islamists was realized in the 
Troika government. 
In contrast, a close working relationship 
between Islamists and Nidaa Tounes would 
indeed prove difficult. Many members of 
Ennahda regard Nidaa Tounes as counter-
revolutionary and part of the old regime, 
which committed torture and other human 
rights violations against the Islamists and 
other political opponents. Nidaa Tounes, on 
the other hand, was essentially created to 
counter the Islamists. Many of its members 
also accuse Ennahda of complicity with 
violent Salafists. Working side by side in a 
unity government would also risk alienat-
ing members of both parties, especially at 
the base. This is likely to be more severe in 
the case of Nidaa Tounes, whose members 
have often little more in common than 
their anti-Islamist stance. By contrast, over 
the past years Ennahda has been able to 
retain a certain degree of unity and support 
even after taking positions that were fierce-
ly criticized by its base, such as when it 
voted against the political exclusion law. 
In the eyes of some Nidaa Tounes mem-
bers, Ennahda’s vote against political exclu-
sion makes them a potentially more reliable 
partner than the Popular Front, which 
voted against it. On December 5, Nidaa 
Tounes voted in favor of Ennahda’s Abdel-
fattah Mourou as vice-president of parlia-
ment, sidelining the Popular Front’s can-
didate. 
A broad coalition would still be prefer-
able in both parties to a narrow Nidaa 
Tounes-Ennahda coalition, which would 
theoretically also be feasible but certainly 
alienate even more party members. Before 
the elections, leaders of Ennahda and Nidaa 
Tounes engaged in a sort of preemptive 
coalition negotiation, which was strongly 
criticized by members of both parties. The 
latter suspected that a “secret pact” was 
formed between their leaders: with Nidaa 
Tounes promising to not prosecute Islam-
ists for crimes they may have committed in 
the past, while in turn Ennahda would not 
pursue former Ben Ali affiliates. To the 
frustration of many party members, in 
practice this deal has already been realized 
to a certain extent: the vast majority of 
senior members of the Ben Ali regime were 
set free from prison and a decreasing num-
ber of Nidaa Tounes’ members have called 
for the Egyptian scenario – especially once 
the new leadership in Cairo had not only 
cracked down on the Muslim Brotherhood, 
but on all opposition. 
Although a broad coalition would be 
the lesser evil to a narrow coalition for 
many members of Ennahda and Nidaa 
Tounes, forming it might prove difficult 
because some smaller secular parties would 
most likely be opposed to joining it. The 
Popular Front in particular, which is argu-
ably even more critical of Ennahda than 
Nidaa Tounes, would probably not be wil-
ling to join a government in which the 
Islamists participate, not least because many 
of its members hold Ennahda responsible 
for the 2013 assassinations. 
Even though there is a risk that a broad 
coalition would be inefficient, in the case 
of Tunisia it could help to decrease polari-
zation between Islamists and secularists, 
which would be a milestone for Tunisia’s 
young democracy. Indeed, polarization is a 
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key threat to instability in Tunisia, and 
decreasing it is a precondition for promot-
ing economic growth and undermining 
security challenges. 
Key Disputes and Challenges 
Tensions might be aggravated if Essebsi 
wins the presidential elections, which 
could foster the perception of an all-
dominant Nidaa Tounes. This might pro-
mote polarization between secularists and 
Islamists, many of whom are afraid that 
Nidaa Tounes might limit their freedoms. 
Supporters of Moncef Marzouki, a human 
rights activist and former head of the CPR, 
maintain that Essebsi entertains a polariz-
ing discourse. They particularly reject 
Essebsi’s accusation that Marzouki voters 
are Islamists and radical Salafis. This has 
already led to some protests in the margin-
alized south of the country, where people 
tend to be more conservative – foreshadow-
ing the extent of instability that a Nidaa 
Tounes-led government might trigger if it 
is perceived as being exclusive and opposed 
to more traditional sections of society. 
Indeed, in socioeconomic terms, most 
people in Tunisia are worse off than before 
the revolution, especially in the marginal-
ized interior regions and the south. Almost 
60 percent of Tunisians now describe the 
economic situation as very bad, compared 
to 20 percent polled in September 2011. 
Most politicians attribute the economic 
downturn to a decrease in foreign invest-
ment and the number of tourists coming 
to Tunisia. However, an important factor is 
that corruption in Tunisia has most prob-
ably increased since the revolution and that 
many of the patronage structures that were 
established under Ben Ali have been re-
inforced rather than dismantled. In 2014, 
the Corruption Perception Index ranked 
Tunisia 79 out of 177 countries – a drop 
from place 59 just before the revolution. 
In the scenario of a broad coalition that 
includes the Islamists, a key risk is that 
the suspected “pact” between Ennahda and 
Nidaa Tounes would prevent structural eco-
nomic reforms and rather reinforce the 
crony capitalist structures established 
under Ben Ali, thereby further marginaliz-
ing the country’s interior regions. 
As many people struggle to make ends 
meet, they have become alienated by what 
they see as ideological battles taking place 
in politics. An increasing number of Tuni-
sians have thus been withdrawing from 
politics, while some have become drawn to 
more destructive forms of opposition, such 
as Salafi jihadism. Fearing that if Essebsi 
were to become president, he might further 
alienate conservative sections of society, 
Ennahda released a statement on November 
27 calling upon Essebsi to remain neutral 
and avoid dividing Tunisians along religious 
and regional lines. At the same time, Ennah-
da itself might contribute to the alienation 
of conservative Muslims if it appears to be 
too compromising toward former Ben Ali 
figures and corrupt businessmen. 
Essebsi’s presidency would arguably not 
be in the interest of Nidaa Tounes. Indeed, 
to date, Essebsi has been Nidaa Tounes’ uni-
fying figurehead, capable of keeping the 
party’s diverse ideological currents relative-
ly united. However, as a president, Essebsi 
would have to abandon all his party respon-
sibilities. This would risk creating disunity 
among the diverse ideological currents with-
in Nidaa Tounes and could, in the worst 
case, even lead to the implosion of the party. 
Tunisia Needs an 
Evenhanded Europe 
Europe, and especially Germany, should 
reaffirm their explicit support for Tunisia 
while remaining realistic about the various 
challenges the young democracy is facing. 
In that respect, the EU should be careful 
when presenting Tunisia as a “model” of a 
successful democratic transition. It is true 
that Tunisia represents a lot of hope for 
many people in the region. But the narra-
tive of the model should not lead Euro-
peans to gloss over difficulties and to down-
play the extent of support the EU should 
still provide. 
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On the economic side, the EU should 
continue to encourage investment in the 
marginalized regions in the interior of the 
country and reinforce its financial support. 
It should also reiterate the need for struc-
tural economic reforms. Many of the patron-
age networks established under Ben Ali are 
still in place and reinforce the marginaliza-
tion of broad segments of the population. 
Dismantling these structures of cronyism 
are key to fostering inclusive economic 
growth. That might prove difficult, given 
that all major parties have strengthened 
their ties to the business elite. It would 
therefore be reasonable to tie financial 
aid from Europe to structural economic 
reforms and concrete measures to curb 
corruption. In this vein, Europeans should 
pursue their projects that Germany, for 
example, had planned to carry out together 
with the Ministry to Fight Corruption and 
Promote Good Governance before the latter 
was abolished earlier this year. The projects, 
including the establishment of a joint good 
governance academy, should still be pur-
sued, preferably within an independent 
framework. 
Europe should also help Tunisia to 
reform and strengthen its security sector. 
This is especially important because up to 
3,000 Tunisians are said to have joined the 
so-called Islamic State in the war in Syria 
and Iraq, which may create a security prob-
lem upon their return to Tunisia. In addi-
tion, the security crisis in Libya is a major 
challenge for Tunisia, especially because 
the vast border between both countries is 
impossible to control, despite recent efforts 
to increase army patrols and surveillance. 
Tunisian and Libyan jihadis have prepared 
joint attacks in Tunisia. The security forces 
in Tunisia are ill-equipped and -trained to 
deal with these people and would welcome 
more external expertise from Europe. At 
the same time, the EU should try to ensure 
that any responses to violent Islamists are 
in conformity with human rights and not 
used to justify a wider crackdown on con-
servative Muslims (for details see SWP 
Comments 53/2014 by Christian Mölling 
and Isabelle Werenfels). 
Lastly, the EU should reaffirm its willing-
ness to remain a strong and evenhanded 
partner. In that respect, it should be careful 
to refrain from being more lenient toward 
transgressions of human rights that might 
be committed in the future by secular 
parties in government. A priority should be 
to foster dialogue and cooperation between 
various ideological forces. These actions 
should go beyond focusing on the main par-
ties, but should also include smaller political 
forces and civil society, with the objective 
of improving coexistence and cooperation 
between all Tunisians. Europeans should 
offer to support dialogue fora of various 
sorts, choose inclusive approaches in proj-
ects they fund, and back local mediators 
in cases of political crisis and ideological 
or regional polarization, which will most 
certainly reoccur. 
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